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Abstract
In the Sudano-sahelian zone, which includes Northern Cameroon, the inter-annual vari-
ability of the rainy season is high and irrigation scarce. As a consequence, bad rainy seasons
have a detrimental impact on crop yield. In this paper, we assess the risk mitigation capac-
ity of weather index-based insurance for cotton farmers. We compare the ability of various
indices, mainly based on daily rainfall, to increase the expected utility of a representative
risk-averse farmer.
We first give a tractable definition of basis risk and use it to show that weather index-
based insurance is associated with a large basis risk, whatever the index considered. It
has thus limited potential for income smoothing, a conclusion which is robust to the utility
function. Second, in accordance with the existing agronomical literature we find that the
length of the cotton growing cycle, in days, is the best performing index considered. Third,
we show that using observed cotton sowing dates to define the length of the growing cycle
significantly decreases the basis risk, compared to using simulated sowing dates. Finally we
find that the gain of the weather-index based insurance is lower than that of hedging against
cotton price fluctuations provided by the national cotton company. This casts doubt on the
strategy of supporting weather-index insurances in cash crop sectors selling at international
market prices without recommending any price stabilisation scheme.
Keywords: Weather, index-based insurance, cash crop, price risk.
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1 Introduction
Traditional agricultural insurance suffers from an information asymmetry between the
farmer (agent) and the insurer (principal), and thus requires costly damage assessment.
Moral hazard issues indeed stem from the incentive for the farmer to reduce effort put into
production when he knows that a bad yield will be compensated. An emerging alternative
is insurance based on a weather index used as a proxy for crop yield (Berg et al., 2009).
In such a scheme the farmer pays an insurance premium every year and receives an
indemnity if the weather index falls below a determined level (the strike). Weather index-
based insurance (WII) does not suffer from the two shortcomings mentioned above: the
weather index provides an objective, and relatively inexpensive, proxy of crop damages.
However, its weakness is the basis risk that comes from the imperfect correlation between
the weather index and the yields, or more precisely losses, of farmers contracting the
insurance.
This paper therefore assesses WII contracts which aim at sheltering farmers against
drought risk. Insurance indemnities are triggered by low values of the index supposed to
explain yield variation. This kind of insurance makes it possible to pool risk across time
and space in order to limit the impact of weather shocks on producer income.
A recent but prolific literature about WII in low income countries has analysed the
impact of pilot programmes through ex post studies. The take up rates have been very
low in those studies (in particular in two case studies in India: Gine´ et al., 2008 and
Cole et al. 2013 and one in Malawi: Gine´ and Yang, 2009). These low take-up rates
have been puzzling researchers (Karlan and Morduch, 2010). Several explanations have
been proposed and tested in other recent ex-post studies: steep price elasticity; existing
informal risk sharing networks (Karlan et al., 2012; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2013 and
Cole et al., 2013); lack of trust or financial literacy (Hill et al., 2011; Cai et al., 2012 and
Gine´ et al., 2012), compound risk aversion (Elabed et al., 2013) and ambiguity aversion
(Bryan, 2010).
However, the possibility of the benefit of WII being too low given the basis risk and
the costs of running the scheme has still not been ruled out and the question of the
interest of such products for development still remains unsolved (Barnett et al., 2008 and
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Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012). Surprisingly there are few ex ante assessments of the benefits
from, and basis risk of, WII in the long run. Ex ante estimations give a long run view and
show anticipated gains in terms of consumption smoothing for farmers in ideal conditions.
If these anticipated gains are low, they provide a simple explanation of the observed low
take-up rate.
There are several studies looking at the ex ante benefit from WII in other locations
and for other crops (Breustedt et al., 2008 in Kazakhstan; Vedenov and Barnett, 2004 in
the US; Berg et al., 2009 in Burkina-Faso, De Bock et al, 2010, in Mali). These studies
showed in particular that using a cross-validation technique is necessary to avoid over-
fitting, and that at best, these insurances can bring a significant benefit only for a few
crops and locations among those analysed. The study with the closest target is de Bock et
al. (2010) who studied the potential of index insurance for cotton in Mali but the match
of annual rainfall and yield data was reduced to 3 districts due to data availability and
to only one district because of a lack of correlation between the weather index and yield
in the two others.
In this paper, we look at the potential benefit cotton farmers could gain from index
insurance and at the design basis risk associated with various weather indices, by com-
paring it to area-yield insurance, i.e. an index perfectly correlated to observed cotton
yield in the relevant location. We made this assessment using state-of-the-art techniques:
we tested two utility functions, using several levels of risk aversion in the range of the
results given by a field experiment and we used a cross-validation technique, controlling
for over-fitting. To our knowledge, there is no similar work assessing the magnitude of
basis risk of WII in the long run and for several localities using empirical data.
We use aggregated data, which prevents from studying the effect of idiosyncratic
shocks that are known to be significant (Leblois et al., 2013), but we also compare area-
yield insurance to what can be considered as a benchmark risk management tool in the
case of cash crops i.e. the hedging of intra-seasonal price fluctuations already offered by
the national cotton company through a forward pricing mechanism. As in the other ex
ante studies noted above, we do not consider the potential impact of insurance on farmers’
behaviours (mainly risk taking and intensification) and on market access (mainly input
and credit), limitations on which we will come back to later.
3
The next section describes the cotton sector in Cameroon while the third is dedicated
to describing the data and the methods. In the fourth section we present the results
before concluding.
2 Cotton sector in Cameroon
2.1 Recent trends
According to Folefack et al. (2011), cotton is the major cash crop of Cameroon and
represents the major source of income, monetary income in particular, for farmers (more
than 200 000 in 2010) of the two northern provinces: Nord and Extreˆme Nord. It is
grown by smallholders with an average of about 0.7 hectares per farmer dedicated to
cotton production in the whole area.
At the peak of production, in 2005, 350 000 farmers cultivated 232 000 ha while, be-
tween 2005 and 2010, the number of farmers and the area cultivated with cotton dropped
by 40%. Farmers abandoned cotton production after experiencing a dramatic reduction
in their margin due mainly to an increase in fertilizer prices.
There are also significant weather-related risks. Cotton is indeed rainfed in almost all
producing countries of sub Saharan African, and largely depends on rainfall availability.
The impact of a potential modification of rainfall distribution during the season or the
reduction of its length has recently been found to be of particular importance (cf. section
3.2) and could even be higher with an increased variability of rainfall (ICAC, 2007 and
2009) that may occur under global warming (Roudier et al., 2011). Moreover, farmers
unable to reimburse their input credit at harvest1 are not allowed to take an input credit
(for cotton but also for food crops) from the national cotton company during the next
year. A situation of unpaid debt would thus be detrimental to cotton farmers in the long
run (Folefack et al., 2011).
Lastly, the sector also faces other challenges: an isolation of the North of the country
and a decline in soil fertility due to increasing land pressure.
1 The standing crop is used as collateral and credit reimbursement is deducted from farmers’ revenue
when the national company purchases the cotton, cf. section 2.2 for further descriptions.
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2.2 Purchasing price fixation, current hedging and input credit
scheme
In Cameroon, the cotton society (Sodecoton), like its Malian, Senegalese and Chadian
counterparts, is still a national monopsony (Delpeuch and Leblois, 2013). It is thus the
only agent to buy seed cotton from producers at a pan-seasonally and -territorially fixed
price. It then gins the cotton and sells the fibre on international markets.
As already mentioned by Makdissi and Wodon (2004), price stabilisation has an impact
on production decisions since it insures producers against intra-seasonal variations of the
international cotton price by guaranteeing the announced price.
The cotton sector’s institutional setting is also characterized by input provision. Costly
inputs are indeed provided on credit by the national companies before sowing, ensuring
a minimum input quality. Such inputs are made available in remote areas in spite of a
substantial cash constraint that characterizes the sowing period corresponding to the end
of the lean season: the so-called ‘hunger gap’. Inputs are distributed at sowing (from May
20 onwards, depending on the latitude) and reimbursed at harvest. The amount of credit
is deducted, at harvest, from the purchase of seed cotton.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Area and data
The cotton administration counts 9 regions divided into 38 administrative Sectors. Cotton
farmers are grouped into producer groups (PGs), roughly corresponding to the village
level. There were about 2000 active PGs in 2011, which represented an average of about
55 PGs per Sector (the spatial administrative unit used throughout this article).
Yield and profit per hectare are provided by the Sodecoton at the Sector level from
1977 to 2010. It is an aggregation of data from the producer groups’ level used for the
internal accounts of the national company. As the company is the only buyer and the
only input provider in the country, it is an exhaustive database of the cotton producers in
Cameroon. Area and production (used to calculate yield) and inputs excluding labor costs
(used to calculate profits) are also very reliable because the company follows each growing
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Figure 1: Network of weather stations (large circles) and rainfall stations (small circles)
and Sodecoton’s administrative zoning: the Sectors level. Sector locations (grey dots:
average of GPS coordinates of every Sodecoton PG within the Sector) are at an average
distance of 10 km and a maximum distance of 20 km of the nearest station. Sources:
Sodecoton, IRD and GHCN (NOAA).
6
campaign closely. Agronomic data are matched to a unique meteorological dataset built
for this study. It includes daily rainfall and temperatures (minimum, maximum and
average) coming from different sources2, with at least one rainfall station per Sector
(figure 1, a sector represents about 900 square kilometres).
We use ten IRD and Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN) weather stations
of the region: six in Cameroon and four in Chad and Nigeria3. Because of the low density
of the network of weather stations, we interpolated temperature data for each Sector.
We use a simple Inverse Distance Weighting interpolation technique4, each station being
weighted by the inverse of its squared distance to the Sector considered. We apply a
reduction proportional to 6.5 degrees Celsius ( ◦C) per 1000 meters altitude. The average
annual cumulative rainfall over the whole producing zone is about 950 mm (table 1),
hiding regional heterogeneities we explore in the next section.
Finally, in addition to rain and temperature data, we use the Normalized Difference
Vegetation Index (NDVI) available for a 25 year period spanning from 1981 to 2006 at
8 km spatial resolution, which is directly related to green plant biomass5. Profit (Πi,t)
observed at the sectoral level is the difference between the value of cotton sold and the
value of purchased inputs.
Πi,t = Pt × Yi,t − Ci,t (1)
i denotes the sector, t is the time index with a yearly step, Pt the annual cotton
purchasing price for the whole cotton growing zone, Yi,t the yield in kg per hectare of one
sector for a given year and Ci,t the costs of inputs (fertilisers and pesticides) per hectare
of one sector for a given year. Labour is not included since the vast majority of workers
are self-employed. The unit used is the CFA franc, the parity of which is fixed at the
exchange rate of 657.91 CFA francs for 1 EUR. 1 USD thus represents approximately 500
CFA francs in 2013.
2 Institut de la Recherche pour le De´veloppement (IRD) and Sodecoton’s high density network of rain
gauges.
3 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), available at: www7.ncdc.noaa.gov
4 IDW method (Shepard 1968), with a power parameter of two.
5 The NOAA (GIMMS-AVRHH) remote sensing data are available online at:
www.glcf.umd.edu/data/gimms), Pinzon et al. (2005).
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We will focus on the 1991-2004 sub-period, the summary statistics of which are similar
to those of the whole period (cf. Appendix E for the indices studied) except for yields and
profits which are significantly higher (table 1). We restricted the period under consider-
ation for two reasons. First, the profit series suffered from a high attrition rate before
1991, with about one third of missing yield data (in comparison, only 18% is missing for
the period between 1991 and 2010). Second, following our reference period, the collapse
of the cotton sector since 2005 has caused cotton leaks, i.e. side-selling in borderland ar-
eas towards Nigeria, where prices are sometimes 3 times higher (Kaminsky et al., 2011).
Production leaks and cotton inputs used for the benefit of food crops (as acknowledged
by Folefack et al., 2011 from 2005 onwards, due to high input prices) could threaten the
quality of the yield and profit data.
Inter-annual variations in Sodecoton purchasing prices and input costs contribute to
variations in cotton profits throughout the period. We however do not take such variations
into account since the inter-annual variations of input and cotton prices are considered
in crop choice along with acreage and input use decisions. Hence, estimating the cost of
these inter-annual variations would require a model with endogenous crop choice, which is
beyond the scope of the present article. We thus value cotton and inputs at their average
level over the period considered. By contrast, intra-seasonal price variations matter, at
least those occurring during the crop cycle. We address the issues related to intra-seasonal
price variations in section 4.2.
Table 1: Yield and rainfall data summary statistics
Whole period (1977-2010) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Annual cumulative rainfall (mm per year) 950 227 412 1 790 849
Yield (kg/ha) 1 150 318 352 2 352 849
Cotton profit † (CFA francs per ha) 114 847 50 066 -7 400 294 900 849
1991-2004 sub-period
Annual cumulative rainfall (mm per year) 953 211 491 1 708 479
Yield (kg/ha) 1 202
∗∗∗
297 414 2 117 479
Cotton profit ∗ (CFA francs per ha) 134 323
∗∗∗
50 542 4 838 294 900 479
† Profit for one hectare of cotton after input reimbursement, excluding labor.
Student test for the equality of the average 1991-2004 sub-period compared to the rest of the sample:
∗
p < .1,
∗∗
p < .05,
∗∗∗
p < .01
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3.2 Weather indices
The role of weather in cotton growing in Western and Central Africa has been documented
in previous studies. For instance, Blanc et al. (2008) pointed out the impact of the
distribution and schedule of precipitation during the cotton growing season on long run
yield plot observations in Mali. Blanc et al. (2008), Marteau et al. (2011) and Traore
et al., 2014 show that the length of the rainy season, and more particularly its onset,
are major determinants of cotton and cereal yield in the region. They have recently
been found to be the major drivers of year-to-year and spatial variability of yields in the
Cameroonian cotton zone (Sultan et al., 2010). It is explained mainly by the fact that
the number of bolls (cotton fruit including the fibre and the seeds) and their size are
proportional to the cotton tree growth and development, which itself is proportional to
the length of the growing cycle.
We use the sowing dates reported by Sodecoton in the form of the share of the acreage
sowed with cotton observed every 10 days, from May 20 to the end of July. We define
the beginning of the season as the date for which half of the cotton area is already sown.
The relationships between yields and observed sowing date is shown in Appendix F.
Table 2: Indices description.
Index name Description Goodness of fit to yield (r2)
Lengthobs after sowing Length of the growing cycle, from the observed .11
sowing date to the last rainfall
Sowing dateobs Observed sowing date, in days from the first of January .16
In table 2, we provide the definition of the two indices retained for their relatively high
performance (cf. figure 7 in Appendix F for the relation between sowing date and cotton
yield and profit), i.e. indices for which results will be displayed. We consider the length
of the growing season and the sowing date in days for insuring against a short growing
season or late sowing. In the latter case insurance covers against high values of the index
(late sowing). This last index is very similar to the one used in the R4/HARITA projet
in Ethiopia, which focuses on payouts if the season begins late and/or ends too early.
We have tested more complicated indices, described in Appendix B.1 and B.2. They
are not presented in the results section since they did not perform better than the rather
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simple indices presented. The strength of simple indices over complex ones echoes the sim-
plicity/complexity debate in the documentation about practical implementation. Com-
plexity of the index indeed limits the transparency and acceptability of insurance and
there is a trade-off with its capacity to reflect bad yield (basis risk). It is indeed prefer-
able to choose indices belonging to farmers’ mental representations so that they do not
represent obstacles to implementation as would complex ones. For instance, the onset of
the rainy season and the planting date are already widely used by farmers in the Sahel
and will thus facilitate trust and understanding of the insurance product.
3.3 Definition of rainfall zones
Average annual cumulative rainfall varies between 600 and 1200 mm in the cotton pro-
ducing area characterized by a Sudano-sahelian climate.
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Figure 2: Rainfall zones based on annual cumulative rainfall: North: (1), North East (2),
North West (3), Centre (4) and South (5) and isohyets (in mm for the 1970-2010 period).
Source: authors calculations.
We define five rainfall zones in the following way: we sort Sectors by rainfall level, for
the whole period (1991-2004), and regroup them into zones of similar size. The geograph-
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Figure 3: Boxplots of Yield, Annual rainfall and cotton growing season duration in dif-
ferent rainfall zones.
ical zoning of the cotton cultivation area is displayed in figure 2 and the distribution of
yields, annual cumulative rainfall and length of the rainy season for each zone in figure 3.
The rainfall zones have different average yields, cumulative rainfall and cotton growing
seasonal lengths. The sowing and emerging dates are 10 to 15 days later in the two
northern rainfall zones than in the three others. Since the length of the rainy season is
acknowledged as being one of the major meteorological factors having an effect on yield,
such a feature could explain part of the discrepancies among yields in different rainfall
zones.
3.4 Weather index-based insurance set up
The indemnity is a step-wise linear function of the index with 3 parameters: the strike (S),
i.e. the threshold triggering indemnity payout; the maximum indemnity (M) and λ, the
slope-related parameter. We thus have the following indemnification function depending
on xi,t, the weather index realisation (as defined by Vedenov and Barnett, 2004):
Ii,t(S,M, λ, xi,t) =


M, if xi,t ≤ λ.S
S−xi,t
S×(1−λ)
, if λ.S < xi,t < S
0, if xi,t ≥ S
(2)
When λ equals one, the indemnity is either M (when the index falls below the strike
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level) or 0. The strike ideally should correspond to the level at which the meteorological
factor becomes limiting.
We took this functional form because, to our knowledge, most index-based insurances
presently implemented or studied ex ante are based on this precise contract shape. The
insurer reimburses the difference between the usual income level and the estimated loss in
income resulting from a yield loss, yield being proxied by the weather index realisation.
We use different objective functions to maximise farmers’ expected utility and show
that our results are robust to this choice. We consider both of the following objective
functions, respectively a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function (equation
2) and a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function (equation 3). Results
using the CARA objective function are displayed in Appendix D while those using the
CRRA function are presented in the Results section. Utility functions are the following:
UCRRA(Πi,t) =
(Πi,t + w)
(1−ρ)
(1− ρ)
(3)
UCARA(Πi,t) =
(
1− exp
(
− ψ × (Πi,t + w)
))
(4)
Both objective functions are standard in the economic literature. Following Gray et
al. (2004), w corresponds to non-cotton production, the calibration of which is presented
in Appendix A.2. ρ and ψ are the risk aversion parameters in each objective function,
respectively constant relative risk aversion and constant absolute risk aversion parameters.
Risk aversion is equivalent to inequality aversion in this context and we consider the
agrometeorological relations to be ergodic since we assimilate spatial (Sectoral) variations
to time variations.
Field work (Nov. and Dec. 2011) was carried out to calibrate the risk aversion
parameter of the CRRA function (cf. Appendix A.1), from which the parameters of the
CARA utility function can be inferred. Following Lien and Hardaker (2001), we assume
that ψ = ρ/W , with W = w+E[Π]. We also calibrated W using Sodecoton surveys from
2003, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (cf. Appendix A.2).
Given that 52% of our sample show a risk aversion greater than 1.16 and that gains
were negligible for low risk aversion levels (< 1), we test a range of values between 1 (the
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approximate median value) and 3 for the CRRA function (ρ = [1, 2, 3]).
The certain equivalent income (CEI) with insurance corresponds to:
CEICRRA(Π˜I) =
(
(1− ρ)× EU(Π˜I)
) 1
1−ρ
− w, Π˜I = {ΠI1, ...,Π
I
N} (5)
CEICARA(Π˜I) = (
1
ψ
)× log(−EU(Π˜I)− 1)− w, Π˜I = {ΠI1, ...,Π
I
N} (6)
with EU(Π˜) the expected utility of the vector of profit realisations (Π˜) and N the
number of observations over time and sectors. The insured profit (ΠI) is the observed
profit (Π, as defined in section 3.1) minus the insurance premium plus the hypothetical
indemnity:
ΠIi,t = Πi,t − P (S
∗,M∗, λ∗) + Ii,t(S
∗,M∗, λ∗, xi,t) (7)
with xi,t the realisation of the weather index in year t and sector i. The premium
includes the loading factor β, i.e. the insurer charge for risk loading and administrative
costs, set at 10% of total indemnification, and a transaction cost (TC) for each indemni-
fication, set exogenously to one percent of the average profit, corresponding to one day of
rural wage.
P =
1
N
[
(1+β)×
∑
i
∑
t
Ii,t
(
S∗,M∗, λ∗, xi,t
)
+TC×
∑
i
∑
t
Fi,t
]
, with Fi,t =


1 if Ii,t > 0
0 if Ii,t = 0
(8)
We finally optimize the three insurance parameters in order to maximise expected
utility and look at the gain in CEI depending on the index. The strike, i.e. the threshold
of the meteorological index at which a payout is triggered, is bounded by a maximum
indemnification occurrence rate of 25%, corresponding to the insurer’s maximum risk
loading capacity. These parameter values are consistent with the cost of WII observed in
the country with by far the most substantial experience: India (Chetaille et al., 2010).
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3.5 Basis risk and certain equivalent income
There is not much theoretical work on the definition of basis risk in the context of index
insurance calibration. The Pearson correlation coefficient between weather and yield (or
losses) time series is the only measure used for evaluating the basis risk empirically (see for
instance Carter et al, 2007). Such a measure is imperfect because it does not depend on
the payout function and the utility function which will determine the capacity of insurance
to improve the allocation of resources.
The basis risk can be considered as the sum of three risks: first, the risk resulting
from the index not being a perfect predictor of observed yield at a given geographical
level (called design basis risk hereafter). Second, the spatial basis risk, recently put for-
ward by Norton et al., 2012 on US data: the index may not capture the weather effectively
experienced by the farmer, all the more so if the farmer is far from the weather station(s)
that provide data on which index is calculated. Third, the idiosyncratic basis risk, stem-
ming from heterogeneities among farmers (practices) or among plots (soil conditions).
The intra-village yield variation is indeed often found to be high in developing countries,
but also in high income countries (seminal paper of Townsend, 1994 and Claasen and
Just, 2011). The distinctions between these three sources of basis risk depend on the
insurance set-ups (crops insured, meteorological indices considered and their underlying
data sources, etc.) and especially the geographical scale. The three estimate sources of
basis risk are contingent upon the definition of the unit of insured area, that is to say,
the size of the individual unit (a parcel being very different from a large farm) and the
resolution of the data used (both for farming and meteorological conditions). Increasing
the geographical unit where weather and yield conditions are observed will cause the dif-
ference between individual yield and area-yield to increase, due to both heterogeneous
agrometeorological conditions and soil conditions. The issues arising when dealing with
idiosyncratic basis risk in the case of a WII have been previously analysed in Leblois et
al. (2013). We will here focus on only the design basis risk, as considering other types of
basis risk will simply exacerbate the issues we are raising.
We propose a tractable definition of the design basis risk (DBR), based on the compu-
tation of a area-yield index that is the observation of the actual cotton yield at the same
14
spatial level for which both yield data and weather indices are available. In our case this
level is the Sodecoton ‘sector’, the lowest administrative unit for which data are available.
We thus consider the design basis risk as the difference in percentage of utility gain
obtained by smoothing income through time and space and lowering the occurrence of
bad cotton income through weather index insurance (WII) as compared to a area-yield
index insurance with the same contract type. The latter is a hypothetical insurance
contract based on yield observed at the Sector level. The contract has exactly the same
shape as the payout function defined in section 3.4, and the same hypotheses6 as the WII
contracts, except the index, which is the yield realisation. We will call it AYII (area-
yield index insurance) hereafter, considering this is the best contract possible under these
hypotheses.
BR = 1−
CEI(Π˜IWII)
CEI(Π˜IAY II)
(9)
4 Results
4.1 Insurance gains and basis risk
4.1.1 Whole cotton area
The first line of table 3 shows the gain in percent of CEI that an insurance based on a area-
yield index would bring to an agent with CRRA utiliy function, given our assumptions
on the payout function presented in section 3.4. The rest of the table shows the gains of
other indices as a share of this maximum gain, corresponding to (1-DBR). Results with
a CARA utility function are very similar and are displayed in Appendix D.
The first line of table 5 shows that the benefit is always low, even for the AYII and
high risk aversion. Moreover, we observe a very high basis risk exceeding 50% for most
indices. The best performing indices are the length of the growing season and the sowing
date itself. This last result is coherent with the existing agronomic literature presented in
section 3.2 above. The better performance of the sowing date compared to the length of
the growing period might be explained by the fact that late rains can bring down cotton
6 The premium equals the sum of payouts plus 10% of loading factor and a transaction cost.
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Table 3: CEI gain (CRRA) of index insurances relative to area-yield index insurance
(AYII) CEI gain from 1991 to 2004.
ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3
AYII CEI gain 0.19% 0.92% 1.81%
CEI gains relative to AYII
Lengthobs after sowing 26.25% 33.66% 37.25%
Sowing dateobs 34.98% 50.69% 52.46%
We display in bold insurance contract simulations that reach at least 25% of the
AYII gain, i.e. a basis risk below 75%.
bolls and thus reduce yield. Hence, comparing two years with the same sowing date, the
one with the longest season, i.e. with the latest rain, may either have higher or lower
yield.
As mentioned above, we have tested other indices7, which all showed lower performance
than those presented here. Indeed most of those indices were more complicated, hence
more difficult to understand by potential clients, and none performed better.
As utility functions used may be complicated or imperfect we thought it could be
useful to the reader to get simpler indicators of the risk reduction. As a comparison, the
insurance contract (CRRA, with ρ=2) against a late sowing date reduces the coefficient of
variation (standard deviation on mean) by only 3.9% while the AYII reduces it by 16.6%
and it increases the first decile of income by only 1 .95% while the AYII increases it by
19.6%.
If, as in the present section, the same drought insurance contract is applied to a
large area, some money is transferred from the wettest zones to the driest ones (cross-
subsidisation). In order to show this we divided the cotton zone into 5 rainfall zones
(RZ), which are more homogeneous in terms of weather (the underlying methodology
is explained in section 3.3). As shown in table 4, the driest zones (in the North) are
7 From the simplest to the most complicated: annual cumulative rainfall, the cumulative rainfall over
the observed and simulated rainy season (onset and offset set according to Sivakumar, 1988 criterion)
and the simulated growing phases (GDD accumulation and characteristics of cultivars), the same indices
with daily rainfall bounded to 30 mm, the length of the rainy season and the length of the cotton growing
season, sum and maximum bi-monthly NDVI values over the rainy season and the NDVI values over
October (the end of the season), the cumulative rainfall after cotton plant emergence and the observed
duration of the growing season after emergence in days.
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highly subsidised, while the most humid (in the South) are highly taxed. Clearly, such an
insurance contract would be refused by farmers in the South. Hence, splitting the cotton
zone into different zones is required in order to insure against drought.
Table 4: Net subsidy rate (in percentage of the sum of premiums paid) of index-based
insurances across the 5 rainfall zones (RZ), for rho=2 (CRRA).
RZ 1 RZ 2 RZ 3 RZ 4 RZ 5
Lengthobs after sowing 41.16% 135.27% -86.02% -38.43% -40.94%
Sowing dateobs 108.98% 139.31% -86.20% -59.49% -80.57%
4.1.2 Rainfall zoning
Up to this point, only one insurance contract (characterized by the three parameters: S,
λ and M) has been considered for the whole Cameroonian cotton zone. We will now
calibrate distinct insurance contracts for our five more homogeneous rainfall zones. Table
5 displays, for each index, the in-sample and out-of-sample (in italic) CEI gains with a
CRRA utility function when optimizing insurance in each of the rainfall zones8. In-sample
contract calibrations are displayed in table 10, table 11 and table 12 in Appendix C.
The in-sample gain is the gain of an insurance contract calibrated and tested on
the same data. This estimation may thus suffer from over-fitting, which could lead to
overestimating the insurance gain. Cross validation makes it possible to consider the
gains of an insurance contract that would be tested on a different sample from the one
on which it is calibrated. Different cross validation techniques could be used such as
the leave-one-out procedure (as in Berg et al., 2009 and Leblois et al., 2013) or the use
of a different period (Vedenov and Barnett, 2004) or sample (Chantarat et al., 2013) to
calibrate the index and to assess its performance. In this article, we use a leave-one-out
technique, leaving one sector of each rainfall zone for calibration and testing the data.
Selecting spatial cross validation seems more appropriate than time, given the underlying
trends potentially existing in the series.
8 An alternative would have been to standardise indices by sector i.e. to consider the ratio of the
deviation of each observation to the Sector average yield on its standard deviation. Still, it did not
significantly improve the results, presumably because the weather index distribution differs across rainfall
zones.
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Table 5: In-sample and out-of-sample∗ estimated CEI gain (CRRA) of index insurances
relative to AYII absolute gain, among different rainfall zones, from 1991 to 2004.
ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3
First rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .28% 1.31% 2.57%
.25% 1.30% 2.40%
Lengthobs after sowing 6.52% 24.47% 34.76%
-40.67% 37.10% 24.72%
Sowing dateobs 0% 37.58% 45.64%
49.82% 97.74% 91.68%
Second rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .05% .67% 1.54%
.05% .63% 1.43%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 20.22% 24.85%
0% 39.96% 49.90%
Sowing dateobs 0% 44.86% 54.61%
0% 48.72% 69.06%
Third rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .15% .99% 2.00%
.18% .99% 2.06%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 0% .89%
0% -178.99% -147.85%
Sowing dateobs 0% 0% 0%
-410.55% -216.22% -158.67%
Fourth rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .51% .95% 1.96%
.09% .71% 1.54%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0%
Sowing dateobs 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0%
Fifth rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .20% 1.49% 2.35%
.10% .75% 1.59%
Lengthobs after sowing 57.45% 46.60% 44.71%
183.27% -25.54% 48.40%
Sowing dateobs 69.48% 49.91% 46.82%
-147.51% -10.80% 78.99%
∗ Leave-one-out estimations are displayed in italic.
We display in bold insurance contract simulations that reach at least 25%, i.e. a basis risk below 75%.
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For each sector, out-of-sample estimates are calibrated on the 6 to 8 other sectors of
the same rainfall zone. The optimisation constraints concerning the insurer loading factor
no longer holds on the test sample (but only on the calibration sample). Thus, insurer
profits (losses) that are above (below) the 10% charging rate are equally redistributed
to (taken from) each sector. This artificially keeps the insurer out-of-sample gain equal
to the in-sample case and thus allows comparison with in-sample calibration estimates.
In out-of sample, the insurance parameters can differ among sectors, which explains the
sometimes higher results in out-of-sample than in in-sample.
The interest of out-of-sample estimations appears in particular for the fifth rainfall
zone: while an insurance based on the length of the rainy season seems advantageous to
farmers in the in-sample estimation, such is not the case with the out-of-sample estimation
for a risk aversion parameter below 3. Since this zone is the most humid, the good result
of the in-sample estimation is probably due to over-fitting.
Looking at optimisations among different rainfall zones leads to a different picture
than optimisation over the whole cotton area. First, in the third and the fourth rainfall
zones, no index can be used to hedge farmers. In the other zones, the length of the
growing season and the observed sowing date remain the best performing indices. They
are the only indices that lead to significant positive out-of-sample CEI gain estimations.
In other contexts, using the actual sowing date in an insurance contract is difficult
because it cannot be observed costlessly by the insurer. However, in the case of cotton in
French speakingWest Africa, production relies mainly on interlinking input-credit schemes
taking place before sowing and obliging the cotton company to follow production in each
production group. As mentioned by De Bock et al. (2010), cotton national monopsonies
(i.e. Mali in their case and Cameroon in ours) already gather information about the
sowing date in each region. The sowing date would thus be available at no cost to the
department of production at Sodecoton. Under those circumstances observing the sowing
date, making it transparent and free of any distortion and including it in an insurance
contract would not be so costly.
Insuring against a declared sowing date could create agency issues: moral hazard in
particular. However, in our case, the sowing date is aggregated at the Sector level (about
50 GP, each representing about 4 000 producers). This means that a producer, and even
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a coordination of producers within a GP, cannot influence (and thus distort) the average
sowing date at the Sector level by declaring a later date or by sowing later than optimally.
Moreover, the sowing date is not only declared by farmers but also observed by Sodecoton
agents.
4.2 Implicit insurance against intra-seasonal price variations
As mentioned earlier (in section 2.2), as Sodecoton announces the harvest purchasing
price before sowing, the firm insures farmers against intra-seasonal variations of the inter-
national price. Furthermore, looking at the variation of Sectoral yields and intra-seasonal
international cotton price variations during the 1991-2004 period, the latter vary twice
as much as the former (coefficient of variation of 0.28 for yield vs. 0.42 for intra-seasonal
international cotton price). This suggests that cotton growing profit risk is driven mainly
by intra-seasonal price variations and that production risk only represents the second
source of risk.
Admittedly, this observation is obtained by considering the 1993-1994 season during
which the CFA franc value was halved. However, a sample without this very specific
year still shows a slightly higher coefficient of variation than yield (0.32 vs. 0.28). This
also holds when considering the 1977-2010 period, and when dropping the specific years
1993-1994 and 2010 (during which the highest cotton price was observed).
Sodecoton possibly offers such implicit price insurance at a cost, albeit a cost which
is very difficult to compute. We compare the gain of a free insurance mechanism (we
thus call it stabilisation) compensating for yield and for intra-seasonal price variations.
This does not affect the argument that the level of the price risk is significant, especially
relative to other risks.
We compute the relative variation between the average prices during the 4-month
period after harvest and compared it to the 4 month period before sowing. We use this
relative variation to simulate the profit variations farmers would face due to intra-seasonal
price variations if the cotton company did not insure them against intra-seasonal price
variations. We attribute this variation to the observed producer price and compute the
gain in terms of CEI of the implicit insurance offered by the cotton company.
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We compare the gains of two ways of reducing risk: going from a situation where
farmers face the same price variation as the international price to a situation where they
already know the price at sowing; going from a situation where yields are varying to
a situation where the yield is equal to the average Sectoral yield for the whole period.
We thus assess and compare the CEI gains of removing every yield variation and every
intra-seasonal price variation.
Table 6: CEI gain of intra-seasonal price and yield stabilisation (in-sample parameter
calibration) in each rainfall zone (RZ) and in the whole cotton zone (CZ)
RZ1 RZ2 RZ3 RZ4 RZ5 CZ
(1) CEI gain of intra-seasonal price stab. (CRRA, ρ=2) 10.28% 11.33% 11.84% 12.85% 17.85% 12.98%
(2) CEI gain of intra-seasonal price stab. (CARA, ψ=2/W) 5.41% 4.96% 6.66% 7.23% 8.84% 6.72%
(3) CEI gain of yield stab. (CRRA, ρ=2) 3.09% .74% 2.88% 1.91% 3.75% 2.46%
(4) CEI gain of yield stab. (CARA, ψ=2/W) 1.49% .40% 1.07% 1.00% 1.77% 1.16%
(3)/(1) 3.33 15.31 4.11 6.73 4.76 5.28
(4)/(2) 3.63 12.40 6.22 7.23 4.99 5.79
Table 6 shows the gain due to the stabilisation of intra-seasonal cotton price variations
and the gain of a stabilisation of Sectoral yield levels with the observed yield distribution
in each rainfall zone. The last column of table 6 shows the CEI gain afforded by the
stabilisation of the intra-seasonal cotton international price and yields for the whole cotton
zone for the same period. The stabilisation of yield brings a much lower gain than the
stabilisation of intra-seasonal variation of the international cotton price already hedged by
Sodecoton: depending on the rainfall zone and utility function, the gain from the former
is between 3 and 15 times that of the latter.
These results hold when considering simpler indicators of risk reduction: while sta-
bilizing prices reduces (increases) the coefficient of variation (first decile) of the income
distribution of 59% (9.4%), stabilizing yield is only reduces (increases) it of 20% (3.6%).
5 Conclusion
Micro-insurance, and in particular weather-index insurance, is currently strongly sup-
ported by development agencies and international institutions. In this paper, we pro-
vide an ex ante assessment of weather-index insurance for risk-averse cotton farmers in
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Cameroon. We compute the benefit of such insurance for several weather indices, three
levels of risk aversion (the distribution of which was assessed through field work) and
two different utility functions. To avoid over-fitting, we use an out-of-sample estimation
technique.
Our results calls for caution about the benefits of weather-index insurance, at least
in the context we study. Firstly, even if the weather index were a perfect predictor of
cotton yield (which is impossible), the benefit for farmers in terms of certain equivalent
income would be less than 3%. This is much less than the benefit of the hedging against
intra-annual price fluctuations currently provided by the national cotton company. This
result highlight the necessity of offering price stabilization schemes for cash crop farmers in
other countries. Such schemes could for instance be implemented using option or futures
hedging against intra-seasonal variations of the international price within contract farming
schemes.
The insurance could however play a role on the risk taking of farmers, and increase
average yields in the long run by giving incentive to use more risky but more productive
technologies. In addition, insurance could address the risk aversion of lenders, and hence
open access to credit for inputs and foster intensification. Such effects are not taken into
account here and could be significant. Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) indeed report a
strong link between willingness to take up fertilizer and weather risk in Ethiopia and the
opportunity cost of not using risky technology have been evaluated at about 30% of profits
in India by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993). Yet, insurance can ease input use and
intensification only if it significantly reduces weather risk for farmers; otherwise, farmers
will remain reluctant to use risk-increasing inputs and lenders will have no reason to ease
access to credit. Unfortunately, our conclusions on this point are not really positive.
Indeed, we show that all weather indices are highly imperfect. In two out of the five
rainfall zones defined for this study, no weather index could provide a benefit to farmers. In
the remaining three rainfall zones, even the best indices present a design basis risk of about
one half, i.e. an insurance based on such indices would provide only half of the (already
low) benefit of an area-yield index insurance, that provides a perfect hedging against yield
variations. Moreover when looking at the risk reduction using simpler indicators, such as
the standard deviation and the first decile of income distribution, this conclusion remains.
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Therefore although the insurance contract reduces risk, this reduction seems too small to
allow a significant reduction in the default rate of farmers, hence a significant increase
in access to credit. In the case of cotton in Cameroon, access to input credit is however
already widespread.
On a more positive note, we conclude that the best indices are very simple, hence easily
understood by farmers. Furthermore, these indices (the length of the rainy season and
the sowing date) are consistent with the agronomic literature, which concludes that they
are better predictors of cotton yields than e.g. cumulated rainfall. A reduction of weather
risk is still welcome since indebted farmers cannot use Sodecoton inputs, even for staple
crops, and because there are very few available alternative input providers. Moreover,
national cotton companies could distribute such insurance products at a relatively low
cost since they already sell inputs credits to, and buy cotton from, all cotton producers.
All in all, while providing hedging products to small-scale farmers in low-income countries
is certainly welcome, due care should be given to the quantification of the different risks
these farmers face and to the institutions which could provide, or already provide, these
hedging products.
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A Model calibration
A.1 Risk aversion
A survey was implemented in groups of producers situated in 6 different locations9, each
in one region, out of the nine administrative regions of the Sodecoton (cf. section 3.1).
9 The location of those six villages is displayed in figure 5.
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15 cotton farmers were randomly selected in each groups, i.e. randomly taken out of an
exhaustive list of cotton farmers, which is detained by the Sodecoton operator in each
village in order to manage input distribution each year. The core of the survey was
designed to evaluate income and technical agronomic practices. Those producers were
asked to come back at the end of the survey and lottery games were played in groups of
10 to 15 people. We used a typical Holt and Laury (2002) lottery10 apart from the fact
that we did not ask for a switching point but played sequentially each of the 5 lottery
games. In each game farmers were asked to choose among two lotteries (one risky and one
safe) for a given probability of the bad outcome. It thus allowed the respondent to show
time inconsistent choices, ensuring that she/he understood the framework and revealed
stable preferences.
The 5 paired lottery choices are displayed in table 7. At each step the farmers had to
choose between a safe (I) and a risky (II) bet, both constituted of two options: a good
and a bad harvest. Each option was illustrated by a schematic representation of realistic
cotton production in good and bad years. The gains indeed represent the approximate
average yield (in kg) for 1/4 of an hectare, the unit historically used by all farmers and
Sodecoton for input credit, plot management etc. The gains were displayed in a very
simple and schematic way in order to fit potentially low ability of some farmers to read
and to understand a chart, given the low average educational attainment in the population.
For each lottery game, the choices are associated with different average gains, probabilities
were represented by a bucket and ten balls (red for a bad harvest and black for a good
harvest). When all participants had made their choice, the realisation of the outcome
(good vs. bad harvest) was randomly drawn by children of the village or a voluntary
lottery player picking one ball out of the bucket.
The games were played and actual gains were offered at the end. Players were informed,
at the beginning of the game that they would earn between 500 and 1500 CFA francs,
1000 CFA francs representing one day of legal minimum wage in Cameroon. We began
with the lottery choice associated with equal probabilities, for which the safer option is
10 The difference of Table 4 with the Binswanger (1981) lottery, which is the most common lottery
type in the literature, is that option gains are fixed and probabilities changing (opposite in a Binswanger
lottery where probability of occurence of each option is fixed but gains changing on each line).
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Table 7: Lotteries options
I II
Risk aversion (CRRA)
Number of BB (prob. RB BB RB BB Difference (II-I) of when switching
of a good outcome) expected gains from I to II
5/10 150 250 50 350 0 ≤ 0
6/10 150 250 50 350 20 ]0,0.3512]
7/10 150 250 50 350 40 ]0.3512,0.7236]
8/10 150 250 50 350 60 ]0.7236,1.1643]
9/10 150 250 50 350 80 ]1.1643,1.7681]
> 1.7681
BB goes for black balls and RB for red balls
more interesting. Then, in each game, the relative interest of the risky option increased
by raising the probability of a good harvest. We thus can compute the risk aversion level
using the switching point from the safe to the risky option (or the absence of switching
point).
We drop each respondent that showed an inconsistent choice11 among the set of inde-
pendent lottery choices representing 20% of the sample: 16 individuals on 80. We choose
the average of each interval extremity as an approximation for ρ, as it is done in the
literature (e.g. Yesuf and Bluntstone, 2009).
Following the methodology presented above, we find that 20% of the sample (N=64)
shows a risk aversion below or equal to .72, and 38% a risk aversion greater than 1.77 under
CRRA hypothesis. We display the distribution of the individual relative risk aversion of
farmers of the 6 villages in figure 4.
A.2 Other incomes
We use three surveys ran by Sodecoton in order to follow and evaluate farmers’ agro-
nomical practices and covering the 2003-2004, 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 growing seasons.
We also use recall data for the 2007 and 2008 growing season from the last survey. The
locations of surveyed clusters (GPs) are distributed across the whole zone, as displayed in
figure 5. We compute the share of cotton-related income in on-farm income for 5 growing
11 For instance a respondent that shows switching points indicating a risk aversion parameter greater
than 1.7236 and below or equal to .3512 to is dropped.
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Figure 4: Distribution of relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter density (N=64).
seasons. Cotton is priced at the average annual purchasing price of the Sodecoton and
the production of major crops (cotton, traditional and elaborated cultivars of sorghum,
groundnut, maize, cowpea) at the price observed in each Sodecoton region for a given
year.
Table 8: On-farm and cotton income of cotton producers during the 2003-2010 period (in
thousands of CFA francs)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Cotton income 246.064 278.751 185 4 525.1 5 190
Total income 606.546 661.70 587 9 520.68 5 190
Cotton income share of total income (%) 45.5 23.1 .3 100 5 190
∗ Composed of cotton and other crops (mainly cereal) incomes.
Source: Sodecoton’s surveys and author’s calculations.
Table 8 shows that the share of cotton income represents, in average, about half (more
precisely 45.5%) of the whole seasonal income of cotton farmers. We thus fix average
non-cotton income to the average cotton income of our sample.
It however can be assumed that cotton income and other incomes (mainly coming
from other crops) are correlated. Even if each crop has its own specific growing period, a
good rainy season for cotton is probably also good for other crops. The same reasoning
can be applied to other shocks (e.g. locust invasions). As a robustness check (not shown
here), we tested on-farm income as increasing in function of cotton income, by estimating
the relation between both variables on the same surveys, but it did not modify the results
significantly.
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Figure 5: Villages in which lotteries were implemented (6 red dots), and Sodecoton’s
income surveys location (small yellow dots).
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B Additional indices tested
B.1 Growing period and growing phases schedule
We first consider the cumulative rainfall over the growing period. We then consider a
refinement of the cumulative rainfall, by bounding daily rainfall at 30 mm, corresponding
to water that is not used by the crop due to excessive runoff (Baron et al., 2005).
As mentioned in section 3.2, we showed the results for indices on a growing season
computed on an observed (obs) sowing date. However we compared those results to the
ones of indices using a simulated sowing date, that were systematically found to be lower.
We indeed also simulate a sowing date following a rainfall calculated criterion of the onset
of the rainfall season, defined by Sivakumar (1988) and adapted to cotton, since cotton
is sowed later than cereal crops in the Sudano-sahelian zone. It is based on the timing
of first rainfalls daily occurrence and validated on the same zone by Bella-Medjo et al.
(2009) and Sultan et al. (2010). We tested whether observing the sowing date could be
useful to weather insurance compared to using a simulated sowing date. Indeed, simulated
sowing date performed well for the same type of insurance contract in the case of millet
in Niger (Leblois et al., 2011). We compared the two growing period schedules, and since
we always found the observed one to perform better it is the only one discussed in the
article.
We also try to distinguish different growing phases of the cotton crop. Cutting-in
growing phases allows to determine a specific trigger for indemnifications in each growing
phase. We do that by defining emergence, which occurs when reaching an accumulation
of 15 mm of rain and 35 growing degree days (GDD)12 after the sowing date. We then
set the length of each of the 5 growing phases following emergence only according to the
accumulation of GDD, as defined by Cre´tenet and Dessauw (2006) and Freeland et al.
(2006). The end of each growing phases is triggered by the following thresholds of degree
days accumulation after emergence: first square (400), first flower (850), first open boll
(1350) and harvest (1600). The first phase begins with emergence and ends with the
first square, the second ends with the first flower. The first and second phases are the
vegetative phases, the third phase is the flowering phase (reproductive phase), the fourth
12 Calculated upon a base temperature of 13 ◦C.
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is the opening of the bolls, the fifth is the maturation phase that ends with harvest.
The use of different cultivars, adapted to the specificity of the climate (with much
shorter growing cycle in the drier areas) requires to make a distinction different seasonal
schedule across time and space.
For instance, recently, the IRMA D 742 and BLT-PF cultivars were replaced in 2007
by the L 484 cultivar in the Extreme North and IRMA A 1239 by the L 457 in 2008 in
the North province. We simulated dates of harvest and critical growing phases13 using
Dessauw and Hau (2002) and Levrat (2010). The beginning and end of each phase were
constraint to fit each cultivar’s growing cycle, table 9 in Appendix B.1 review the schedule
of critical growing phases for each cultivar.
The total need is 1600 GDD, corresponding to about an average of 120 days in the
considered producing zone, the length of the cropping season thus seem to be a limiting
factor, especially in the upper zones (figure 2) given that an average of 150 is needed for
regular cotton cultivars, Cre´tenet and Dessauw (2006).
Table 9: Cotton cultivars average spatial and temporal allocation
Cultivars 1st flower date 1st boll date Period of use
(by province) (Days after emergence) (Days after emergence)
Allen commun 61 114 untill 1976
444-2 untill 1976
Allen 333 59 111 1959-197?
BJA 592 61 114 1965-197?
IRCO 5028 61 111 untill 1987
IRMA 1243 53 102 1987 - 1998
IRMA 1239 52 101 2000-2007
IRMA A 1239 52 101 2000-2007
L 457 52 104 2008-onwards
Extreˆme-Nord
IRMA L 142-9 59 109 until 1984
IRMA 96+97 55 115 1985 - 1991
IRMA BLT 51 99 1999-2002
IRMA BLT-PF 56 116 2000 - 2006
IRMA D 742 51 95 2003-2006
IRMA L 484 51 105 2007 - onwards
Sources: Dessauw (2008) and Levrat (2010).
13 See figure 6 in Appendix B.1 for the spatial distribution of cultivars.
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Figure 6: Spatial repartition of cultivars in 2010, dots are representing producers groups
buying seeds, IRMA 1239 in black, IRMA A 1239 in green, IRMA BLT-PF in yellow and
IRMA D742 in cyan.
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B.2 Remote sensing indicators
There is a cost in terms of transparency to use a complex vegetation index, such as NDVI,
that is not directly understandable for smallholders. There is thus a trade-off to be made
between delays (minimized when using near real-time products), transparency and basis
risk. In a similar study in Mali (De Bock et al., 2010) vegetation index is found to be more
precise than rainfall indices following a criterion of basis risk (defined as the correlation
between yield and the index).
We used the bi-monthly satellite imagery (above-mentioned NDVI) during the growing
season and considered annual series from the beginning of April to the end of October. We
standardized the series, for dropping topographic and soil specificities, following Hayes
and Decker (1996) and Maselli et al. (1993) in the case of the Sahel. There are 2 major
ways of using NDVI: one can alternatively consider the maximum value or the sum of the
periodical observation of the indicator (that is already a sum of hourly or daily data) for
a given period (say the GS). As an example Meroni and Brown (2012) proxied biomass
production by computing an integral of remote sensing indicators (in that particular case:
FAPAR) during the growing period. Alternatively considering the maximum over the
period is also possible since biomass (and thus dry weight) is not growing linearly with
photosynthesis activity during the cropping season, but grows more rapidly when NDVI is
high. McLaurin and Turvey (2012) for instance considers, in the case of index insurance,
that the maximum represents the best vegetal cover attained during the GS and will
better proxy yields. We thus tested indices using both methods and also considered all
bi-monthly observations of standardized NDVI during the cotton cropping season.
C In-sample contract parameter calibration
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Table 10: Indemnification rate in in-sample calibrations (CRRA), among different rainfall
zones, from 1991 to 2004.
ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3
First rainfall zone
AYII 14.29% 25.00% 25.00%
Lengthobs after sowing 7.32% 24.39% 24.39%
Sowing dateobs .00% 21.95% 21.95%
Second rainfall zone
AYII 11.25% 25.00% 25.00%
Lengthobs after sowing .00% 12.20% 24.39%
Sowing dateobs .00% 24.39% 24.39%
Third rainfall zone
AYII 17.65% 22.35% 24.71%
Lengthobs after sowing .00% .00% 4.08%
Sowing dateobs .00% .00% .00%
Fourth rainfall zone
AYII 17.60% 24.80% 24.80%
Lengthobs after sowing .00% .00% .00%
Sowing dateobs .00% .00% .00%
Fifth rainfall zone
AYII 3.81% 24.76% 24.76%
Lengthobs after sowing 4.26% 14.89% 14.89%
Sowing dateobs 4.26% 12.77% 12.77%
Table 11: Slope related parameter (λ) in in-sample calibrations (CRRA), among different
rainfall zones, from 1991 to 2004.
ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3
First rainfall zone
AYII 64.29% 64.29% 64.29%
Lengthobs after sowing 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Sowing dateobs .00% 7.14% 64.29%
Second rainfall zone
AYII 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Lengthobs after sowing .00% 100.00% 92.86%
Sowing dateobs .00% 57.14% 57.14%
Third rainfall zone
AYII 14.29% 92.86% 92.86%
Lengthobs after sowing .00% .00% 100.00%
Sowing dateobs .00% .00% .00%
Fourth rainfall zone
AYII 92.86% 92.86% 92.86%
Lengthobs after sowing .00% .00% .00%
Sowing dateobs .00% .00% .00%
Fifth rainfall zone
AYII 71.43% 100.00% 100.00%
Lengthobs after sowing 100.00% 14.29% 50.00%
Sowing dateobs 7.14% .00% 42.86%
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Table 12: Maximum indemnification (M , in CFA francs) in in-sample calibrations
(CRRA), among different rainfall zones, from 1991 to 2004.
ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3
First rainfall zone
AYII 74905 84268 93631
Lengthobs after sowing 22609 27131 31653
Sowing dateobs 0 76872 85915
Second rainfall zone
AYII 22002 29336 33003
Lengthobs after sowing 0 19453 19453
Sowing dateobs 0 19453 23344
Third rainfall zone
AYII 129991 39997 44997
Lengthobs after sowing 0 0 14530
Sowing dateobs 0 0 0
Fourth rainfall zone
AYII 35852 46095 51216
Lengthobs after sowing 0 0 0
Sowing dateobs 0 0 10087
Fifth rainfall zone
AYII 47279 33095 37823
Lengthobs after sowing 39961 154848 94907
Sowing dateobs 109892 84916 54946
D Robustness to the objective function choice: re-
sults with CARA
Table 13: CEI gain (CARA) of index insurances relative to AYII absolute gain from 1991
to 2004.
ψ = 1/W ψ = 2/W ψ = 3/W
AYII CEI gain .40% 1.16% 1.88%
CEI gains relative to AYII
Lengthobs after sowing 32.04% 36.79% 39.95%
Sowing dateobs 46.43% 49.81% 52.49%
We display in bold insurance contract simulations that reach at least 25% of the
AYII gain, i.e. a basis risk below 75%.
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Table 14: In-sample and out-of-sample∗ estimated CEI gain (CARA) of index insurances
relative to AYII absolute gain, among different rainfall zones, from 1991 to 2004.
ψ = 1/W ψ = 2/W ψ = 3/W
First rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .11% .56% 1.09%
.10% .57% 1.10%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 19.66% 30.32%
-47.22% -23.25% 1.61%
Sowing dateobs 0% 33.89% 42.29%
-15.84% 32.68% 43.58%
Second rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain 0% .19% .48%
0% .17% .44%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 18.27% 25.36%
0% 9.20% 9.08%
Sowing dateobs 0% 39.23% 55.52%
0% 14.52% -56.34%
Third rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .05% .38% .79%
.04% .22% .55%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 0% 1.17%
0% -223.85% -117.81%
Sowing dateobs 0% 0% 0%
1748.96% -357.76% -158.65%
Fourth rainfall zone
AYII CEI gain .08% .51% 1%
.07% .49% .98%
Lengthobs after sowing 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0%
Sowing dateobs 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0%
Fifth rainfall zone sample
AYII CEI gain .04% .30% .65%
.10% .19% .50%
Lengthobs after sowing 55.11% 45.03% 44.03%
66.24% 28.24% 43.22%
Sowing dateobs 66.54% 48.45% 45.75%
44.18% 92.74% 68.33%
∗ Leave-one-out estimations are displayed in italic.
We display in bold insurance contract simulations that reach at least 25%, i.e. a basis risk below 75%.
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E Homogeneity of weather indices between periods
Table 15: Student test of equality of mean inside and outside of the sub-period considered
(1991-2004)
Variable Mean (1991-2010) Mean (>=2005) Mean (<2005) |Diff| |t| Pr (|T| > |t|)
Lengthobs after sowing 119.41 119.31 119.50 0.19 0.13 0.89
Sowing dateobs 181.99 181.20 180.50 1.48 1.38 0.17
∗
p < .1,
∗∗
p < .05,
∗∗∗
p < .01
Generally indices were not significantly different in the two period before and after
2004, according to the student test (cf. Table 15), except for the bounded cumulative
rainfall that was 40 mm higher in the second period.
Table 16: Chow test of equality of coefficients in linear time trends regressions inside and
outside of the sub-period considered (1991-2004)
Variable Chow stat. (Fisher) Pr (equal. coeff.)
Lengthobs after sowing 11.61 0.99
Sowing dateobs 9.54 0.99
∗
p < .1,
∗∗
p < .05,
∗∗∗
p < .01
Table 16 shows that there is no significant rupture in the trend before and after 2004,
according to the chow test. Table 15 and 16 makes us confident about the absence of
trends and the applicability of the results of the period studied on the next one (after
2004).
F Cotton income and observed sowing date
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Figure 7: Box plot of cotton yield and profit (1991-2004), depending on observed sowing
date expressed in calendar days after the first of January.
We show in Figure 7 the relation between yield and cotton profit, depending on the
sowing date, observed every 10 day from the 10 of June to the first of August. The
negative relation with yields, holds with cotton profits.
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